Deep Neural Networks for image classification have been found to be vulnerable to adversarial samples, which consist of sub-perceptual noise added to a benign image that can easily fool trained neural networks, posing a significant risk to their commercial deployment.
Introduction
Artificial Neural Networks have made a resurgence in recent times and have achieved state of the art results on numerous tasks such as image classification (Russakovsky et al. 2015) . As their popularity rises the investigation of their security will become ever more relevant. Adversarial examples in particular -which involve small, tailored changes to the input to make the neural network misclassify it -pose a serious threat to the safe utilization of neural networks. Recent works have shown that adversarial samples comprise of nonrobust features of datasets, and that neural networks trained on adversarial samples can generalize to the test set (Ilyas et al. 2019) . Because these non-robust features are invisible for humans, performing inference on lossy reconstructions of the adversarial input has the potential to shed light on the dependence between the adversarial noise and the robust features of the image.
In this work, we seek to analyze adversarial samples in terms of their contribution to the principal components of an image and characterize the vulnerability of these models. We
Background and Prior Work Adversarial Samples
We consider a neural network f (·) used for classification where f (x) i represents the probability that image x corresponds to class i. Images are represented as x ∈ [0, 1] w.h.c , where w, h, c are the width, height and number of channels of the image. We denote the classification of the network as c(x) = argmax i f (x) i , with c * (x) representing the true class, or the ground truth of the image. Given an image x and an image classifier f (·), an adversarial sample x follows two properties:
• D(x, x ) is small for some distance metric D, implying that the images x and x appear visually similar to humans.
• c(x ) = c * (x) = c(x). This means that the prediction on the adversarial sample is incorrect whereas the original prediction is correct.
In this work, we focus on 3 methods to generate adversarial samples.
DeepFool. Deepfool (Moosavi-Dezfooli, Fawzi, and Frossard 2016) is an iterative untargeted attack technique to manipulate the decision boundaries of neural networks while minimizing the L 2 distance metric between the altered (adversarial) example and the original image.
Jacobian Saliency Map Attack: Papernot et al. introduced the Jacobian-based Saliency Map Attack (Papernot et al. 2016 ), a targeted attack optimized under the L 0 distance. The attack is a greedy algorithm that utilizes the saliency map of neural networks to pick pixels to modify one at a time, increasing the target classification on each iteration.
Carlini Wagner Attack. For a given image, the goal of the Carlini Wagner attack (Carlini and Wagner 2017) is to find a small perturbation such that the model misclassifies the input as a chosen adversarial class. The attack can be formulated as the following optimization problem:
||δ|| p is the p-norm. In this paper we use the L 2 norm i.e. p = 2.
Prior Work
There have been several prior works in detecting adversarial samples. (Bhagoji, Cullina, and Mittal 2017) , which show PCA to be an effective defense against certain adversarial attacks on smaller datasets such as MNIST. Our method, however, is different in that we seek to understand adversarial samples based on their contributions to the principal components of a single image, and that we use the rows as principal components, thereby allowing us to scale our technique to much larger datasets such as ImageNet.
Methodology Threat Model
There are two different settings for adversarial attacks. The most general setting is the black box threat model where adversaries do not have access to any information about the neural network (e.g. gradient) except for the predictions of the network. In the white box threat model all information about the neural network is accessible, including its weights, architecture, gradients and training method. In this work we consider situations where adversaries have white-box access to the neural network.
Defensive PCA (Carlini and Wagner 2017) and (Bhagoji, Cullina, and Mittal 2017) have shown PCA to be an effective defense against certain adversarial attacks on smaller datasets, where n is the number of samples in the dataset and d the number of features (rows × columns) of each sample. This works well when the dataset and number of features are small, however, for larger datasets with larger inputs this method becomes computationally inefficient as the size of the data matrix scales quadratically with the size of dataset.
To tackle this emerging problem we suggest an alternative way to perform PCA, where n = w is the number of rows and d = h × c is the product of the number of columns and the channels of an image x ∈ [0, 1] w.h.c . In doing so we can capture the correlations between pixels of an image and vastly reduce the number of dimensions required for PCA. Additionally, this method is independent of the dataset size. Furthermore, our method also has the added advantage that it requires no knowledge of the dataset which makes it more versatile.
We term this new method of performing PCA as rowPCA denoted as C = P row (x) for an input image x ∈ [0, 1] w.h.c , which treats each h × c row of x as a principal axis. As an example, an ImageNet input image x with dimensionality (224 × 224 × 3) will generate 224 principal components. We can then reconstruct our image x from the principal components with smaller components contributing smaller variance to the image. We denote the first i principal components [c 1 , c 2 , ...c i ] as C 1:i , and the image reconstruction operation as P inv,row (·). The reconstructed image x * generated from the first i row principal components is thus x * = P inv,row (C 1:i ). Figure 1 shows several reconstructed inputs for a benign sample. 
Detecting Dominant Classes
We define the dominant class as the predicted class on the full image x. The (k, p) point is defined as a tuple consisting of the component when the dominant class starts becoming the top prediction and the softmax probability p of the dominant class at that particular component number. Algorithm 1 outlines the procedure to obtain the (k, p) point for a particular input, and Figure 2 demonstrates the functionality of our detection method on an adversarial sample. The steps that occur are:
• The input image is decomposed into its principal components by the rows. • Each of the sets C 1:k of descending principal components (sorted by by eigenvalue) is used to reconstruct the image.
• Each reconstructed image is fed through the neural network and the predictions are observed. • The (k, p) point is found for the particular set of predictions for each image and is subsequently used to determine whether that particular sample is adversarial or benign. Figure 2 : Visualization of defensive PCA applied to an adversarial input. For an input image, we reconstruct the image from the principal components and perform inference on each to determine the component when the dominant class starts becoming the top prediction. The dominant class could be the adversarial class for adversarial inputs, or the ground truth or misclassified class for benign inputs. Attack methods: For each of the models we evaluated our method on the DeepFool (Moosavi-Dezfooli, Fawzi, and Frossard 2016), Jacobian Saliency Map Attack (JSMA) (Papernot et al. 2016) and Carlini-Wagner L2 attack (Carlini and Wagner 2017) using the Foolbox library (Rauber, Brendel, and Bethge 2017) . For each of the 9 (attack, model) pairs, we generated 100 adversarial images.
Results
Behavior of adversarial samples. Figures 3a, 3b and 3c shows the clustering of adversarial samples in similar regions of the (k, p) space, while figure 3d shows the clustering of benign samples in similar regions of the (k, p) space. Figure 4 shows the (k, p) points of all the adversarial and benign points, demonstrating their separability. Figure 5: Inter-model and Intra-model adversarial sample detection. We achieve near perfect prediction rates for simple discriminative models trained to identify adversarial samples from one (attack, model) pair and evaluated on a different one. The y axis represents the (attack, model) we trained our classifier to identify, and the x axis represents the (attack, model) we evaluated our classifier on.
Discussion
PCA is one of numerous linear methods for dimensionality reduction of neural network inputs. Other techniques such as Sparse Dictionary Learning and Local Linear Embedding are potential alternatives to PCA, which we intend on exploring in future work. One particular limitation of our method is the need for many rows in the input, which would make our defense inapplicable to inputs for smaller neural networks.
Conclusion
We identify a new metric, the (k, p) point, to analyze adversarial samples in terms of their contributions to the principal components of an image. We demonstrate empirically that the (k, p) points of benign and adversarial samples are distinguishable across adversarial attacks and neural network architectures and are an underlying property of the dataset itself. We train a binary classifier to detect adversarial samples and achieve a 93.36% detection success rate.
